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Abstract 
The main rhetoric of the European Union for the Western Balkans,  since the mid 1990’s has 
developed around the idea that if the Western Balkans implement the reforms recommended by 
the EU, they will develop economically, build a healthy democracy based on a functional rule 
of law system.  In case of the failure of the reforms to achieve these objectives, which indeed 
is often the case, the answer is founded in the (liberal) modernization theory which argues that 
the reasons for the failure must be found on the domestic problems and the wrong 
implementation of the reforms whose beneficiary properties are taken for granted. This paper 
argues that contrary to the modernization theory, despite the fact that Albania faces many 
domestic socio-economic problems, structural causes and mechanisms/processes, which 
emerge from the operation of global economic system (neo-liberal globalization) rest at the 
center of this failure. This paper, based on the insights of the neo-Gramscian perspective, 
analyzes the EU integration strategies towards Albania as part of the neo-liberal globalization 
project/agenda. The complex and dynamic relations based on consent and coercion during this 
process and the role of the European Commission as the main instrument of this strategy will 
constitute the focus of this paper. Here is underlined the fact that despite the EU discourse on 
the implantation of reforms on democracy, human rights and the rule of law as pre conditions 
for full membership, in practice the Commission initiatives are strongly focused and restricted 
to the neo-liberal restructuring of Albania while leaving no concrete space for full membership. 
By the same token, reforms on the rule of law and democracy are reduced on the requirements 
of the neoliberal economic-political model of accumulation. As a result the main elements of 
the Commission strategies such as the neo-liberal economy restructuration, rule of law and 
democracy have not developed proportionally, leading to the reproduction of a kind of 
authoritarian state.  
Keywords: Neo-liberal restructuring; Western Balkans; Albania; European 
integration policies. 
 
 
26 
 
 
Introduction 
The objective of this article is to analyze the impacts of global structural changes and the 
European Union (EU) integration policies as part of neo-liberal restructuring agenda in Albania.    
To begin with, it is important to highlight that the concept of transition which has become a 
buzzword to denote the socio-economic and political transformation of post-socialist countries, 
cannot be defined as just a shift from a planned economy to a free market democracy, rather it 
is a complex process of redefinition and restructuring of state society relationship (Shields, 
2012: 17-18), which led to the emergence of a new configuration of social power relations. As 
Hermann puts it, despite the fact that“neoliberalism is an international agenda, the 
implementation of neoliberal policies is, nevertheless, dependent on local struggles and 
compromises”(2007: 6). Therefore, a complete analysis of the transition and integration 
(restructuring/transformation) of Albania, must include both domestic and external actors and 
factors. Yet it is impossible to touch upon all these factors in this paper. Thus, the examination 
will be focused on the effects of the international financial institutions policies and the EU 
strategy towards Albania in the context of neo-liberal restructuring. This is because, the neo-
liberal restructuring itself constitutes the very environment where Albanian politics – often 
accused as the main responsible for the failure to build a state of law – operate. This does not 
mean that domestic factors does not play an important role, rather it implies that incentives for 
the actions of domestic actors can be better understood and explained when placed into a 
structural conditional environment. Thus, contrary to the widespread belief that equates the 
failure to build a (democratic) state of law with corruption permeating all Albanian society – 
the latter seen as an intrinsic Albanian problem (Kajsiu, 2014: 5) – it will be argued that the 
main domestic actors (like political elites) act within the limits imposed by structural factors 
such as the implementation of neo-liberal policies. The main argument is that the central driving 
force of transition in post-socialist Albania is the neo-liberal restructuring agenda which is 
imposed both by international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank (WB) and the EU integration policies.  
 
 
The European integration as part of neo-liberal restructuring project  
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Many Europeans as well as the bulk of them who aspire to be part of the EU, considerate it as 
an exceptional organization of the global system. Often the assumed exceptional character of 
the EU is based on the social rights and equality policies that European states offer to their 
citizens compared with their American and Asian counterparts (Hermann, 2007:1).However, 
the EU cannot be considered apart and immune from the globalization process. As everywhere 
else, structural changes in the global economic system reshaped also the socio-economic 
relations of the EU, which led to the emergence of new social power configurations (Bieler and 
Morton, 2001: 5).Therefore, Stephen Gill argues that taking into consideration the social 
structural and political arrangements during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s is crucial for 
understanding the European integration policies/process(1992: 159), sincetheneo-liberal 
restructuring became the underlying driving force of its revival. 
According to the neo-Gramsian perspective, globalization isthe “transnationalisation of 
production and finance at the material level and the shift from Keynesianism to neo-liberalism 
at the ideological level”(Cox, 1993: 259-60; Bielerand Morton, 2001: 5).While on the global 
level,the main driving force was assumed to be the free market, unrestricted capital and 
financial mobility (Hermann, 2007:2), on the national level, the shift from Keynesianism to 
neoliberalism was based on low inflation and stability prices, and on the abandonment ofthe 
full employment(Cox, 1993: 259-60, 266-7). Indeed these new arrangements caused many 
serious problems for many countries, particularly for the undeveloped ones.The international 
financial institutions, such as the IMF and the WBfurthered this process through their carrot 
and stick policies, thus making the granting of credits conditional on meeting the neo-liberal 
restructuring packets such as budgetary restrictions and privatization of public companies, 
enterprises and services, andapplication of low taxes for private sectoretc. (Hermann, 2007:4). 
Shortly, neo-liberalism become an agenda for restructuring the capitalist economy and the 
social system (ibid:2).Neo-liberalism imposes a new top down socio-economic order, through 
consent and coercion mechanisms. That makes governments more responsible for private 
enterprises or market forces and less responsibleor responsive to welfare issues. The security 
of private sectors remains one of the main objectives of governments (Gill, 2001:47).In this 
context the rule of law and democracy are required(for developing countries) as long as they 
serve to neo-liberal restructuring policies. Accordingly,while some developed countries 
embraced neo-liberal policies for competing with theglobal market, the rest accepted it in order 
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to get aids/grants from the international financial organizations since their survival depended 
directly to this foreign financial assistance.  
The revival of European integration process inthe 1980s developed also within the context of 
global structural changes triggered by the neoliberal response to the structural crisis of over 
accumulation that emerged in 1970s. The policies delivered by the EU and the re-launch of 
European integration – through the Internal Market (1985) and the signing of the Single 
European Act (1986)–by no means departs from the neoliberal mainstream.This re-launching 
coincided with the foundation of the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT), an 
organization that represents the Europe’s biggest transnational industrial corporations 
(Apeldon, 2001: 48, 54). The increase of globally oriented capital in the EU, supported by the 
neo-liberal transnational historical bloc also forcedthe restructuring of the capital consistent 
with global capital (Gill, 2001: 75). The ERT lobbied strongly for the integrationof the common 
market (Hermann, 2007: 8). 
Gill defines the Internal Market project as a turning point in the European integration process 
towards neoliberalism (2003: 63).Even though, the Internal Market primarily was introduced 
as the creation of a big home market in front of global market, it served to the globalization of 
the EU itself (Apeldon, 2001: 79). Indeed it is an important project for the neo-liberal 
restructuring of the EU, focused on free market by the deregulation and liberalization of 
national economies (ibid). Thus, European integration shifted from a “socio-economic and 
industrial space to…an advanced free trade zone within a free trading world” (ibid). 
The Maastricht Agreements and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) also constitute 
important developments to be discussed in the terms of neo-liberal restructuring discourse (Gill, 
2001: 50).As Apeldon puts it “the socio-economic content of Maastricht can in fact be 
interpreted as reflecting the transnational configuration of social and political forces within the 
European political economy at the beginning of the 1990s” (2001: 81). The formation of a 
transnational capitalist class played an important role in this new configuration of the social 
power relations. It succeeded in incorporating and manifestingits interest as the interests of all 
and therefore in establishing its hegemony. Contrarily, trade unions remained fragmented and 
as a result failed to protect their previous gains and efforts. The restructuring of the state-civil 
society relations such as the privatization of public services like pensions, health and education 
and the implementation of monetary and fiscal policies in order to increase the credibility for 
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private enterprises shifted the EU towards the neo-liberal economic system (Gill, 2001: 49).In 
a nutshell, social democracies were subordinated to the interest of globalizing 
capital.Consequently, most of social reforms included in the Maastricht treaty failed to be 
materialized because of big capital’s efforts. 
In regard to this, the EMU cannot be considered only as an economic project but as an attempt 
to institutionalize the neo-liberal norms in the region and reconcile regional integration with 
globalizing forces (Gill, 2001: 52). This was a requirement for the Internal Market(Apeldon, 
2001: 80).EMU furthered the neo-liberal economic process by establishing an independent 
European Central Bank (ECB) with a monetary policy based on low inflation and price stability. 
Its role was to force states to apply fiscal policies in convergence with neoliberal criteria. Even 
though the fulfillment of the Single European Market and establishment of the ECB looks as 
just an economic integration in appearance, it is in fact a process of configuration of thenew 
powers in Europe (Holman, 2010). 
As it is shown in this paper, the main issues of the reforms in the EU are focused on 
enhancingthe implementation of neoliberal policies such as free trade, monetaryand fiscal 
austerity policies, and the erosion of employment security. In some aspects, some states in the 
union have gone further by applying more radical neoliberal policies compared to the runners 
of neo-liberalism, the US and the UK. All these reforms eroded the social model of European 
welfare-states. (Hermann, 2007: 23). 
In this respect, the EU strategy towards the Western Balkans must be analyzed primarily within 
this socio-economicstructural context, considering the dynamics and complexity of the process 
of neo-liberal globalization. Otherwise the analysis risks remaining incomplete. Thus, the 
ideational/cultural factors which are so often utilized to explain the problems facing many 
developing countries as is the case of Albania, must be placed into this larger structure or 
process of neo-liberal transformation of the Western Balkans. To this purpose, having argued 
that the EU is an integral part of neo-liberal process, it will be scrutinized the EU integration 
policyand its impacttowards Western Balkans.   
The EU strategy towards the Western Balkans  
During the early 1990s the EU strategy towards the Western Balkans was based on financial 
assistance programmessuch as PHARE, the main objective of which was the establishment of 
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stability through democratic institutions, the rule of law, the return of refugees and protection 
of human rights etc. (Bartlett, 2008: 197).It was only after the Bosnian war that the EU adopted 
the “Regional Approach”, for all the Western Balkan countries that did not have any association 
agreements with it. The Regional Approach included a comprehensive framework for unilateral 
trade preferences, financial assistance and regional cooperation based on principle of 
conditionality (General Affairs, 1997).TheEuropean Commission defines the level of financial 
assistance that EU will provide to the respective country, according to the progress that it has 
done on meeting the required conditions. On the other hand, the starting of bilateral negotiations 
or association agreements were committed to many other strict and detailed conditions on 
providing economic reforms. Thus, in addition to the general conditions mentioned above, were 
required also macroeconomic policies for stabilization of economic environment, liberalization 
of price and trade, reforms in the rule of law, privatization of public or states enterprises, and 
reforms in the banking sector.The countries which meet these conditions would be able to 
benefit from trade preferences, financial assistance and progressing on contractual bilateral 
relations with the EU (Bartlett, 2008: 198). 
Indeed the conditionality was not an exception for the Western Balkans countries, since the EU 
strategy towards the CEE countries was based on conditionality as well (Türkes and Gökgöz, 
2006: 675).The problem here is the so-called “negative conditionality” (AnastasakisandBechev, 
2003: 7), which is meant to offerno promise for a future membership to the EU, and in the case 
of Serbia even outright sanction. Therefore, Turkeş and Gökgöz define the Regional Approach 
as:  
“The manner in which conditionality applied in the case of the Western Balkans 
clarified the contours of a distinctly different mode of relations that the EU 
would maintain with the region: there was no prospect for rapid membership 
but the countries meeting the conditions were to be rewarded with trade 
concessions, financial assistance and economic cooperation on the part of the 
EU.  It emphasized the borders of fragmentation in the region, pushing the 
Western Balkans down to a lower rank in the accession partnership process.” 
(2006: 676) 
The Kosovo war may be considered as a turning point of the EU policies towards the Western 
Balkans. It demonstrated that the Commission as an actor and the EU as a structural factor have 
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been insufficient for the stabilization of the region.Therefore, the EU envisaged a new strategy 
for the Western Balkans, so-called the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP).SAP would 
serve as an important contribution of the EU to the multilateral Stability Pact for Southeastern 
Europe (Hombach, 1999) by taking a leading role in the stabilization of the region, and also 
presenting a new strategy of the Commission in the Western Balkans (Kramer, 2000). Thereby, 
SAP would became the cornerstone of the EU strategies in the Western Balkans, as the major 
policy framework for domestic and foreign policies. According to the Commission’s 
suggestions SAP is focused on six key target areas such as:   
“Development of existing economic and trade relations with and within the 
region; development and partial redirection of existing economic and financial 
assistance; increased assistance for democratization, civil society, education and 
institution-building; co-operation in the area of justice and home affairs; 
development of political dialogue, including at regional level; development of 
Stabilization and Association Agreements [SAA]” (European Commission, 
1999). 
In a similar vein with previous strategies, the SAP instruments were based also on 
conditionality.  Therefore, according to the Commission’s progress reports, the countries which 
have made progress regarding the meeting of the SAP conditions, can pass to another level by 
signing a SAAwith the EU.The SAA’s main framework focuses on:   
“Offering the prospect of full integration with EU structures; Establishing a 
functioning framework for a continuous political dialogue; Supporting the 
consolidation of a democratic regime and a state of law;  Furthering economic 
reforms and the development of market structures; Establishing the 
administrative and economic pre-requisites for the later conclusion of a bilateral 
free trade agreement;  Laying the foundations for extensive co-operation in 
justice and home affairs; Establishing broad co-operation on all issues that 
would contribute to reaching these goals” (European Commission, 1999). 
In this context, the main financial instrument introduced to the region was the so-called 
Community Assistance for Association, Development and Stabilization (CARDS). Later, it 
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would be replaced by the new Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA), which 
aimedbringing institutional reforms into line with the EU standards.  
A bigger picture suggests that the SAP and the SAA itself does not offer a really new and 
inventive EU policy for the region. They do not differ much in kind from other well-known 
European Agreements concluded between the EU and the CEE countries since early 
1990s.Indeed, the novelty remains on the fact that for the first time, the SAA is “offering the 
prospect of full integration with EU structures” to the Western Balkans.In other words, it 
opened a process of gradual integration into the EU structures based on the Amsterdam Treaty 
and the Copenhagen Criteria, for the countries that meet the required conditions. Since then, 
the EU has also advanced trade relations with all the Western Balkan countries via autonomous 
trade measures and the early implementation of the SAA trade provisions.All the countries have 
signed the respective SAAs. In addition, while Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo arepotential 
candidates, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro and Albania are officially candidates for accession 
to the EU.  
As it is noticed above, the Balkan countries are involved at different stages in the process of 
integration (Türkeş and Gökgöz, 2006: 659). But, the fact that Commission has not produced 
yet any concrete plan or strategy for the full membership of the region or any particular country 
in the EU, indicates that its recommendations and strategies serve primarilyto the purpose of 
stability in the region in order to avoid that problems of the region expand into the union and 
second tothe neoliberal restructuring of the region rather than the process/goal of full 
membership. As Mustafa Türkeş and Göksü state, the EU strategy towards the Western Balkans 
does not include neither exclusion nor a full integration in the short period (ibid). Indeed the 
EU integration process is seen as a tool for neoliberal restructuring of the Western Balkans. The 
hegemonic/neoliberal project of the EU in the region, is a complex and dynamic process 
between the Commission and respective governments which includes both consent and 
coercion (Shield, 2014: 17-18). The asymmetrical power that the EU holds in this process, have 
led to a top-down process on the restructuring of the socio-economic relations with the Western 
Balkans. The impact of this process will be further discussed below through the case of Albania.  
The Neoliberal Restructuring of Albania  
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This part will focus on the impacts of the so-called transition, or neo-liberal restructuring project 
in Albania. While the neo-liberal restructuring can be seen as an Anglo-Saxon response (hence 
a project) to counter the structural crisis of over accumulation that begun in 1970s, and which 
was redefined in 1990s with the so-called post-Washington consensus (Wallerstein, 2000;Saad-
Filho, 2005), for the countries of the Western Balkans and Albania in particular neo-liberal 
restructuring become the very structure within which they had to transform themselves.  Thus, 
as was argued in the introduction part of this paper, the concept of transition if is not associated 
with the redefinition of state-society and state-economy reconfiguration triggered by neo-liberal 
restructuring, remains a buzzword unable to penetrate both the social and political economy 
dimension of the transformations taking place in the Western Balkans. In a similar way with 
the countries in the region, Albania passed from a double transformation process, from a 
planned economy to a free market economy and from an authoritarian state to a parliamentarian 
democracy. It is important to stress the fact that Albania’s transition to neo-liberalism took 
place in the absence of the welfare-state. In other words, while the transition to neo-liberal 
restructuring of the Western countries was “tempered” by the presence of the welfare-state 
mechanisms (against whom neo-liberal agenda was directed), the transformation to neo-
liberalism of Albania lacked the supportive mechanisms of welfare-state such as industrial 
unions important to negotiate the reverse effect of mass unemployment caused by massive 
privatizations. To put it laconically, Albania entered communism before capitalism and dive 
into neoliberal globalization before experiencing the Keynesian/welfare-state. Such macro 
historical and structural constraints have defined the general framework of post-socialist 
Albania’s development. 
In 1991 Albania became a full member of institutions such as the IMF and the WB. From this 
moment the macroeconomic policy in Albania was developed under the influence and in 
accordance with the interests of global/Western capital (Chossudovsky, 2000: 388). Thus, in 
1992 the IMF and the WB agreed to “came to the help” of the new Albanian government by 
offering financial aids. Additionally again in 1992 Albania signed the Agreement on Trade and 
Economic Cooperation with the EU (at that time was called European Economic Community) 
(Relations between Albania and the EU, 1992) and later become part of the EU financial 
assistance programme, such as PHARE and other similar programs. As it was already 
mentioned above, all the foreign assistance were based on the principle of conditionality. 
Therefore, as a condition for aids, it was required the implementation of the “shock therapy” 
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stabilization policy (Bartlett: 2008, 31) based on the neo-liberal policies such as stabilization, 
privatization, deregulation, deindustrialization, reduction of the power of labor, and the 
abandonment of social policies on behalf of social discipline.  As a result, all the state 
companies and services were privatized in a short time while most of the new owners of these 
companies become foreign citizens. As such, all economic and financial barriers were removed 
in favor of free market (Chossudovsky, 2000: 388).  In this context, the restrictive monetary 
and fiscal policies imposed in order to decrease the inflation and budget deficit (Bartlett, 2008: 
31) and the rapid privatization of public companies and services caused dramatic consequences 
for all the society. The prevalence of unemployment, low wages, the lack of social assistance 
and services etc. led to a dramatic increase of organized crime and corruption, paving the way 
to informal economy, nonfunctional institutions, lack of the rule of law and political and 
economic instability. Privatization and the removal of customs barriers caused catastrophic 
impacts on the domestic industry and agriculture. Thus, all the domestic production became 
totally unprotected from the global market (Chossudovsky, 2000: 388). The lack of advanced 
technology in industry and agriculture made them unable to compete in the both global and 
domestic market. Everything (even the most basic nutriments) had to be imported from outside. 
This was in tune with the neo-liberal claim that “international trade and finance – rather than 
domestic consumption – should become the engines of development” (Saad-Filho, 2005: 114).  
As a result of pursuing the implementation of the “shock therapy”, fiscal and monetary austerity 
policies increased their impact both on the citizen’s life and in the state mechanisms, causing 
grave waves of emigration and state failure. These drastic reforms culminated in the total 
collapse of state in 1997, generally misconceived as a side-effect of the frenetic get-rich-quick 
behavior of Albanian individuals who invested everything on the pyramid schemes while 
overlooking its structural roots.  Ironically, the very “shock-therapy stabilization policy” that 
was envisaged to deliver sustained economic growth and rising living standards, let Albania to 
ruin.Yet the biggest paradox rest on the fact that instead of applying social policies in order to 
repair the damage in the aftermath of Pyramid Crisis, Albania would enter a more strict neo-
liberal agenda “under the tutelage of the IMF and the WB” (Bartlett, 2008: 33) and the European 
Commission.  During this second stage (1997 onwards) the EU via Regional Approach, SAP 
and SAA strategies would play an even more important role in the neo-liberal restructuring of 
Albania. The consideration of the EU as a financial source for economic prosperity by the 
Albanian states elite’s strengthened the Commission’s hand on neo-liberal restructuring of the 
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region.On the other hand, the lack of domestic production and continuous deindustrialization 
of the country made the country completely depended on the foreign financial assistance and 
loans. This increased the foreign influence on the government’s elites and led them to 
implement all the required reforms without considering the impacts on society. As it is 
demonstrated above, besides the Albanian economic history and policy choices (domestic 
factors), global structural changes and particularly top-down neo-liberal restructuring can be 
seen as the main factors that affected and defined the Albania’s post-socialist development. All 
of the domestic reforms were done in line with recommendations and requirements of the 
international community, such as the IMF, the WB, and the EU. 
Indeed the Pyramid Crisis of 1997 and state collapse, served as a legitimization of the view that 
the responsibility for the Pyramid Crisis rested mainly on the authoritarian practices of Berisha 
government and the corruption of ex-communist elites, while it can be viewed more clearly as 
the rational outcome of implementing the “shock therapy”. Thus, Albania instead of 
interrogating the logic of the socio-economic restructuring they embraced uncritically, and 
which was already criticized sharply in the countries of origin, 1998 onwards it embarked on 
furthering the neo-liberal agenda, ironically, under the auspices of the left-wing Socialist Party 
government of Fatos Nano. It is important to note at this point that both two main political 
parties dominating the post-socialist politics, the Socialist and Democrat Party embraced the 
same ideological philosophy (namely neoliberalism) as the only alternative. This ideological 
collapse become even clearer in the aftermath of Pyramid Crisis of 1997 when neo-liberalism 
was re-introduced under the Socialist Party. As Kajsiu rightly notes “by blaming corruption as 
the major obstacle to economic development, the international discourse on corruption diverted 
criticism away from the shortcomings of the neoliberal developmental model” (Kajsiu, 2014: 
8) enabling as such the reproduction and re-introduction of neo-liberal policies such as the 
privatization of the public sector as central to anti-corruption measures (ibid). Because the 
corruption problem was equated with the abuse of public property, it offered as a natural 
solution to this problem the furthering of privatization. This anti-corruption discourse 
constructed by international institutions and embraced and reproduced by local political elites, 
in turn legitimized the perpetuating of neo-liberal order (ibid: 9) as the sole alternative to 
“socialist regime”.  
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In a nutshell, since the 1990’s the neo-liberal restructuring led to the emergence of an 
authoritarian and corrupted state apparatus, whose main concern at the first stage, has been the 
“primitive accumulation of capital” through illegal ways. While in the other Western countries 
it was the emergence of a transnationally oriented class that forced the (neo-liberal) 
transformation (Bohle, 2006: 75), in Albania, as mostly in the Western Balkans political elites 
were its main perpetrators.  Thus this close relationship between business and political elites 
generated the so-called crony capitalism. At this point it is important to argue that the “capitalist 
class” and government elites in Albania are not independent from each other, rather they 
nurture/construct each other. Because, the roots of the emerging capitalist class in Albania lie 
in illegal sources (like money laundering or abuse/appropriation of public property for private 
gain), they did not possess the capacity nor the will to embark on massive employment 
initiatives via industrial investments.Therefore at the initial stage, they lacked the “raw 
materials” to articulate their narrow interests as the interest of all society and construct a 
hegemony as such. Consequently, their “legitimacy” and “survival” depended on the 
connections they developed with politicians. On the other hand, the politicians (and high 
officials) themselves seem not to base their legitimacy on free elections, democracy, the rule of 
law and in what they offer to the voters, but on the support that comes from this capitalist class, 
by offering privileges to them. 
Another source of legitimacy of Albanian political elites comes from international financial 
institutions. Because Albania’s economy is completely dependent to foreign loans taken from 
the international financial institutions or the EU, political parties in Albania gain their 
legitimacy also through the “successful” implementation of neo-liberal reforms (which means 
deepening the societal crisis) imposed by international institutions and by meeting the 
conditions required by the EU accession agenda, therefore neglecting the social needs of their 
voters. In other words, because of austerity policies imposed by the IMF, the WB and the EU, 
governments except of the rhetoric of democracy, the rule of law and integration to the EU 
cannot offer anything concrete to the voters like job opportunities, and social policies. All they 
can offer them is turning a blind eye to corruption, and informality. In other words, while 
political elites could increase their wealth by appropriating the public propertiesillegally (this 
is why often the capitalist class and political elites in Albania merge with each other), the 
ordinary people were tacitly allowed to “benefit” from the lack of rule of law like letting them 
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to abstain from paying the taxes and by allowing the persistence of informal economy (Zaimi, 
2014).  
Thus, it can be argued that in the first stage of Albania’s capitalist development, has existed an 
implicit consensus between the political elites, big private enterprises and ordinary people on 
the non-application of law and the persistence of informal economy. This situation helped the 
latter to survive in a fierce social environment created by neoliberal reforms. The current 
developments (since the last general elections of 2013) on a different directionsuggest the 
dissolution of this implicit consensus. The capital and crony capitalism seems now to be fully-
fledged, and as such its main duty is to protect the products/fruits of “primitive accumulation” 
by entering the realm of law (Zaimi, 2014). Thus, the system does not tolerate any more 
widespread informality. Yet this move must be read as the outcome of the strengthening of 
capital, since the neo-liberal agenda is alive and well and is re-launched even more furiously 
under the current policies following the Socialist’s takeover in 2013. Ironic as it may seem, 
neo-liberal order in Albania has acquired its highest legitimacy or hegemony during the “left-
wing” governments. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, the social consequences of the top-down neo-liberal restructuring of Albania are 
high unemployment, an ever increasing gap between the rich and the poor, reduction of public 
social services, a high support for big private enterprises even when it has grave consequences 
for society in general, and high public loans etc.By the same token, the high level of emigration, 
the organized crime, and the rise of radical religious organization’s influence in the region is 
also encouraged by the increasing poverty and the failure of state instances to develop a 
solution. In this context, “organic intellectuals”, play an important role on presenting the neo-
liberal norms as the best model for the development of the country (see Civici, 2014). The fact 
that in Albanian politics, the “Third Way” approach or “neo-liberalism with a human face” 
represented by the “left-wing” Socialist Party governance is considered as the famous 
Thatcherian TINA (there is no alternative), demonstrates that neo-liberal agenda in Albania has 
acquired an “hegemonic” power. Indeed the neo-liberal promise of rising living standards, in 
reality has served the process of further subordination of the majority at the degree that has 
made the hope of change seem futile, paving the way to the greatest wave of emigration toward 
the EU since the early 1990s. 
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